Berachot 20a: Rabbi Yochanan and Maternal Impression

On Berachot 20a, the following:

R. Johanan was accustomed to go and sit at the gates of the bathing place. He said: When the daughters of Israel come up from bathing they look at me and they have children as handsome as I am.¹²

This corresponds to an ancient belief held by Galen, and also held by Chazal, of maternal impression. What the woman sees of is thinking about when she has intercourse would have an impact on the baby. This accounts, if I recall correctly, for a Roman matron having a black baby.

In that regard, I am reminded of the following joke:

A missionary is sent into deepest darkest depths of Africa to live with a tribe. He spends years with the people, teaching them to read, write and good Christian values. One thing he particularly stresses is the evil of sexual sin. “Thou must not commit adultery or fornication!”

One day the wife of one of the Tribe’s noblemen gives birth to a white baby. The village is shocked and the chief is sent by his people to talk with the missionary.  

You have taught us of the evils of sexual sin, yet here a black woman gives birth to a white child. You are the only white man who has ever set foot in our village. Anyone can see what’s going on here!”

The missionary replies, “No, no, my good man. You are mistaken. What you have here is a natural occurrence - what is called an albino. Look to thy yonder field. See a field of white sheep, and yet amongst them is one black one. Nature does this on occasion.” 

The chief pauses for a moment then says, “Tell you what, you don'’t say anything about the sheep, I won'’t say anything about the white baby.”

This also finds purchase in the Torah, with Yaakov using striped sticks to influence the sheep to have striped offspring, and as interpreted by Chazal.

Even Shadal adopts this ancient science as likely. See here on parshablog. Other interpretations of that pasuk are still possible.

It seems that the following halacha:

See for example Shulhan Arukh, Yoreh Deah 198:48, where R. Moses Isserles states that if a woman coming home from the mikveh enounters a דבר טמא או גוי , if she is pious she will immerse again.

Is based on this theory of maternal impression. Here is the Rama:

And here is the Shach on the side who brings other sources that say that she should not go back and re-immerse if she encounters a horse, because it means that her children will come out quite nicely:

Nowadays, perhaps halacha is not widely practiced because it is so difficult not to encounter someone on the way, or because, as some explain, it is the first thing encountered, which is the mikveh lady.

I think that even besides this, we don't need to concern ourselves with these quasi-kabbalistic concerns which are really rooted in ancient science which was only recently uprooted. This was not encoded as halacha by the gemara, and at this point, we know that this recommendation by specific Rishonim and Acharonim was based on incorrect science.

Berachot 12b: The Heart as the seat of the Intellect

On Berachot 12b, the following:

הרהור עבירה והרהור ע"ז מנלן דתניא אחרי לבבכם זו מינות וכן הוא אומר (תהלים יד, א) אמר נבל בלבו אין אלהים

Or, in English:

 But where do we find [warnings against] the opinions of the heretics, and the hankering after immorality and idolatry? — It has been taught: After your own heart:²⁹  this refers to heresy; and so it says, The fool hath said in his heart, There is no God.³⁰

At precisely the 34 minute mark in his shiur on the daf, Rabbi Chaim Eisenstein discusses a mussar vort about this. He points out that it does not say the brain but the heart. We see that people go off the derech and adopt heresy not because of intellect, but because of emotion, or because of desires, with the intellectual arguments being ex-post-facto rationalizations. And he gives a practical example of a a philosopher he knows who admits that it was not honest inquiry, but rather difficulties in life that caused the metamorphosis.

Speaker:Rabbi Chaim EisensteinGiven On:Friday August 10, 2012

I'd like to address two points. First, should we actually make such a deduction, from heart = emotion, when in fact Chazal thought heart = mind? Second, whether emotional upheaval involves in some moves to heresy really means that that there is no intellectual merit to the opposing position.

1) In terms of the former, it is already quite well-known that Chazal held, like many ancient Greek scientists, that the heart was the seat of the intellect. If there are scattered references to the brain as the seat of the intellect, in accordance with other ancient Greek scientists, this is because Chazal were not entirely monolithic, but consisted of different very intelligent and learned rabbis, who were exposed to different theories.

I will reproduce here one of my parshablog posts related to this topic, before turning to the second topic:

Summary: A liver is the heart of Pharaoh. So goes a midrash or two. What this may indicate in terms of whether Chazal literally saw the heart as the seat of the intellect.

Post: In last week's parasha, Vaera, we encounter the following pesukim:

יג  וַיֶּחֱזַק לֵב פַּרְעֹה, וְלֹא שָׁמַע אֲלֵהֶם:  כַּאֲשֶׁר, דִּבֶּר ה.  {ס}	13 And Pharaoh's heart was hardened, and he hearkened not unto them; as the LORD had spoken. {S}
יד  וַיֹּאמֶר ה אֶל-מֹשֶׁה, כָּבֵד לֵב פַּרְעֹה; מֵאֵן, לְשַׁלַּח הָעָם.	14 And the LORD said unto Moses: 'Pharaoh's heart is stubborn, he refuseth to let the people go.

Kaveid means heavy, or in this case stubborn. However, it also means liver. Place two internal organs in close proximity to a pasuk, where one is indeed an internal organ and the other is a homonym, and a derasha is born!

And that is precisely what Chazal do. In Shemot Rabba, we read:

ח [ויחזק לב פרעה]ע

ויחזק לב פרעה, ויאמר ה' אל משה כבד לב פרעה כועס הוא.
מה הכבד כועס אף לבו של זה נעשה כבד, אינו מבין כסיל הוא. (קהלת ז, ט) כי כעס בחיק כסילים ינוח. במה מייסרים את הכסיל? במטה, שנאמר: (משלי כו, ג) ושבט לגו כסילים, אף משה ייסר פרעה במטה, שנאמר: והמטה אשר נהפך לנחש וגו' 

Thus:
"He was angry. Just as the liver is angry, so too the heart of this one became a liver {kaveid}, without understanding, he is a fool. Then, citing Kohelet, אַל-תְּבַהֵל בְּרוּחֲךָ, לִכְעוֹס: כִּי כַעַס, בְּחֵיק כְּסִילִים יָנוּחַ. Be not hasty in thy spirit to be angry; for anger resteth in the bosom of fools..."

This derasha gets better and better. The pasuk in Kohelet is deliciously reinterpreted. Usually, kaas, anger, sits in the liver. This was ancient science, in which the liver is the seat of emotions such as lust and rage. The heart was the seat of the intellect. The heart is located in the cheik, the bosom, which would be higher up. Yet in kesilim, foolish people who lack this intellect, it is kaas which is located in their bosom, in their heart. This was a fine point of interpretation that is easy to miss.

This is not the only midrash which interprets this in this way. There is a slight variation of this in Midrash Lekach Tov on this pasuk:

"That is to say, the heart of Pharaoh was turned into a liver {kaveid} -- just as a liver has no understanding to understand and comprehend, so too there was no understanding in his heart to understand and comprehend. Therefore, his heart was hardened and was stubborn for him."

One could point out that there is no understanding in a person's small intestine or in his left big toe, either. Is this simply random, seizing upon the luckily listed body part? I doubt it. Some ancient philosophers believed in a tripartite soul: the rational soul, the animal soul, and the vegetative soul. The rational soul was located in the brain; the animal soul was located in the heart; and the vegetative soul was located in the liver. See here.

But Aristotle, while disputing this tripartite division, put the primacy in the heart and placing the rational soul in no particular place. And Seneca and other Stoics placed the rational soul in the heart. See here.

It therefore does not seem to me to be an accident that this focus is made on heart and organ, and noting that the liver does not have intellect. This midrash appears to agree with these philosophers in making the heart the seat of the rational soul and the liver the seat of the vegetative soul.

What this strongly suggests to me is that when Chazal were talking about the heart, liver, kidneys, etc., as serving certain functions -- e.g. kidneys giving counsel, they were not talking allegorically. Rather, they were in agreement with the scientific state of the art and were speaking literally. Of course, there is room to maneuver and argue otherwise. Still, my guts tell me that this is right. ;)

By the way, Rabbi Natan Slifkin put out a monograph on a related topic,

The Question of the Kidneys' Counsel. It discusses the Scriptural, Talmudic and Midrashic accounts of the kidneys providing counsel to the heart, and explores the response of Rishonim, Acharonim and contemporary figures to this topic. The topic also has broad and significant ramifications for other conflicts between Torah and science, some of which are discussed in the document.

Check it out, if you'd like.

2) I agree that in a large number of cases, when someone goes "off the derech", even where they have intellectual arguments, the start was an emotional upheaval. But at the same time, I suspect that in a large number of cases, when someone becomes a baal teshuva and goes "on the derech", it does not begin with the intellectual arguments of the Discovery seminar and the like, but with an emotional upheaval, or an emotional draw.

For someone to give up his dogma or, even having given up said dogma, throwing his life and relationships into disarray, takes quite a push. People will stay with the status quo. That does not mean that the heretical positions, perforce, without substance; or that the religious positions are, perforce, without substance. That seems like quite a leap to make. One could say that the emotional upheaval led to a reevaluation of one's life and philosophy.

Further, I don't know that every closet heretic or Orthoprax individual (for each person, in each society, in each time) can be so readily dismissed in such a manner, since the matter may well be one of intellectual conclusions, with absence of an emotional trigger to drive them to action. And further, this comes close to boldly asserting that questions are themselves all insubstantial and the result of the yetzer hara. That attitude is likely to alienate people who honestly have questions, and drive them off the derech.

Berachot 3a: Why not enter a ruin to pray?

We see three reasons not to enter a ruins mentioned in the brayta in the gemara:

The Sages taught: Because of three things one does not enter a ruin: because of suspicion, because of collapse, and because of mazikin [harmful spirits].

It should not trouble us that the brayta lists three reasons. So long as they are all true reasons, why not? The setama degamara, however, assumes that if three are given, each must have a chance to hold absent the other two. And so what follows is an extremely systematic analysis, as to how one can construct a situation for each of the three in the absence of the other two.

Thus:

It would be sufficient to say, because of falling debris'? When the ruin is new.¹  But it would be sufficient to say: 'because of demons'? — When there are two people.²  If there are two people, then there is no suspicion either? — When both are licentious [there is suspicion]. — [It states] 'Because of falling debris'. It would be sufficient to say: 'because of suspicion and demons'? — When there are two decent people. [It states] 'Because of demons'. It would be sufficient to say; 'because of suspicion and falling debris'? — When there are two decent people going into a new ruin. But if there are two, then there is no danger of demons either? — In their haunt there is danger. If you like I can say, indeed the reference is to one man and to a new ruin which was situated in the fields; in which case there is no suspicion, for a woman would not be found in the fields, but the danger of demons does exist.

This is unnecessary, and indeed seems to me somewhat farfetched. In particular, where both are licentious?! Prutzim rather than kesheirim? Does the gemara really need to address them, to give them this cause? Surely prutzim would simply enter the ruin and disregard the brayta. (One can answer that one of them is a parutz, and so the one cannot rely on the other for chashad purposes; or, like one rishon, define kasher as a special level of tzadik, and parutz as a regular person; though both have drawbacks).

I have, though, sometimes noticed a trend in which not only is a non-rationalist reason given for a practice, but a rationalist reason alongside it. For example, consider the reason for Mezuzah, from parshas vaEschanan which just passed.

In the gemara in Menachot 33, there are two positions,one (Rabanan) which stresses the psychological impact of encountering it as one enters one's home, while the other (R' Chanina of Sura) regards it as a protective measure of the entire home.

So too, we have an extreme derech hateva reason: danger of collapse; a quasi-mystical reason: demons; and a moral/ethical/social/halachic reason: suspicion of sexual impropriety.

The Rambam, and other rationalists, do not believe in the existence of sheidim. And in general, he leaves out sheidim and other similar matters out of Mishneh Torah. As such, it is a good exercise to see just what he has to say about davening in a ruin.

The Rambam mentions this halacha in two places. Once, in hilchos tefillah,  5:6:

ז  [ו] תִּקּוּן הַמָּקוֹם כֵּיצַד:  יַעֲמֹד בְּמָקוֹם נָמוּךְ, וְיַחְזִיר פָּנָיו לַכּוֹתָל.  וְצָרִיךְ לִפְתֹּחַ חַלּוֹנוֹת אוֹ פְּתָחִים, כְּנֶגֶד יְרוּשָׁלַיִם, כְּדֵי לְהִתְפַּלַּל כְּנֶגְדָּן, שֶׁנֶּאֱמָר "וְכַוִּין פְּתִיחִין לֵהּ בְּעִלִּיתֵהּ, נֶגֶד יְרוּשְׁלֶם" (ראה דנייאל ו,יא).  וְקוֹבֵעַ מָקוֹם לִתְפִלָּתוֹ, תָּמִיד.  וְאֵין מִתְפַּלְּלִין, בְּחֻרְבָה; וְלֹא לַאֲחוֹרֵי בֵּית הַכְּנֶסֶת, אֵלָא אִם כֵּן הִחְזִיר פָּנָיו לְבֵית הַכְּנֶסֶת.  וְאָסוּר לֵישֵׁב בְּצַד הָעוֹמֵד בַּתְּפִלָּה, אוֹ לַעֲבֹר לְפָנָיו--עַד שֶׁיַּרְחִיק מִמֶּנּוּ אַרְבַּע אַמּוֹת.

but he does not give reasons. So too in hilchos rotzeach vishmirat nefesh, perek 12, about entering a ruin in general:

ה  [ו] וְכֵן לֹא יִנְעֹץ הַסַּכִּין בְּתוֹךְ הָאֶתְרוֹג אוֹ בְּתוֹךְ הַצְּנוֹן--שֶׁמֶּא יִפֹּל אָדָם עַל חֻדָּהּ, וְיָמוּת.  וְכֵן אָסוּר לָאָדָם לַעֲבֹר תַּחַת קִיר נָטוּי, אוֹ עַל גֶּשֶׁר רָעוּעַ, אוֹ לְהִכָּנֵס לְחֻרְבָה; וְכֵן כָּל כַּיּוֹצֶא בְּאֵלּוּ מִשְּׁאָר הַסַּכָּנוֹת, אָסוּר לַעֲמֹד בִּמְקוֹמָן.

We can also check out what the Meiri has to say about it:

"It is of the traits and approach of the Chachamim that one should not enter a ruin, nor any other place that would provide an opening, for those who see, for suspicion due to his entering those places. And even if he needs to enter there in order to pray in seclusion, it is better for him to play on the road. And when he prays, he should pray a short tefillah is he fears that passersby may interrupt him, rather then entering into the ruin. 'A short tefillah' -- this is not absolutely short, for behold they only permitted this because of wild animals and robbers. Rather, havineinu; or the beginning and end of each bracha [of Shmoneh Esrei], as is explained in perek Tefillat HaShachar [29b].


Even in a place where there is no worry [of suspicion] such as if there are two who are decent people known for their fear of sin, he needs to take care not to enter the ruin because of fear of falling debris, and so too from fear of anything which would be a concern for danger due to his entering there."


That last (bolded) phrase certainly seems to me to be a dance around the word mazikin as demons; yet he clearly does take to heart, and to halacha, the gemara and brayta's concern."

Though I am not at all convinced that this was the intent of the brayta and gemara, one can generalize from mazikin, or even take mazikin not as demons/evil spirits, but as harmful entities of any sort. Consider the Biblical discussions of seirim, taken as demons. E.g. Yeshaya 13:

יט  וְהָיְתָה בָבֶל צְבִי מַמְלָכוֹת, תִּפְאֶרֶת גְּאוֹן כַּשְׂדִּים, כְּמַהְפֵּכַת אֱלֹהִים, אֶת-סְדֹם וְאֶת-עֲמֹרָה.	19 And Babylon, the glory of kingdoms, the beauty of the Chaldeans' pride, shall be as when God overthrew Sodom and Gomorrah.
כ  לֹא-תֵשֵׁב לָנֶצַח, וְלֹא תִשְׁכֹּן עַד-דּוֹר וָדוֹר; וְלֹא-יַהֵל שָׁם עֲרָבִי, וְרֹעִים לֹא-יַרְבִּצוּ שָׁם.	20 It shall never be inhabited, neither shall it be dwelt in from generation to generation; neither shall the Arabian pitch tent there; neither shall the shepherds make their fold there.
כא  וְרָבְצוּ-שָׁם צִיִּים, וּמָלְאוּ בָתֵּיהֶם אֹחִים; וְשָׁכְנוּ שָׁם בְּנוֹת יַעֲנָה, וּשְׂעִירִים יְרַקְּדוּ-שָׁם.	21 But wild-cats shall lie there; and their houses shall be full of ferrets; and ostriches shall dwell there, and satyrs shall dance there.
כב  וְעָנָה אִיִּים בְּאַלְמְנוֹתָיו, וְתַנִּים בְּהֵיכְלֵי עֹנֶג; וְקָרוֹב לָבוֹא עִתָּהּ, וְיָמֶיהָ לֹא יִמָּשֵׁכוּ.	22 And jackals shall howl in their castles, and wild-dogs in the pleasant palaces; and her time is near to come, and her days shall not be prolonged.

We see all sorts of animals in abandoned buildings. And even if we feel compelled to take reference to seirim to mean that they must exist, seirim does not need to mean demons. Malbim indeed takes it as sheidim, writing:

ושעירים -

הם השדים, כמו לשעירים אשר הם זונים אחריהם, ונקראו כן, לפי שהם נראים כדמות שעירים למאמין בהם.

וכן תרגם יונתן: 

ושידין יחייכון תמן.

Ibn Ezra, who does not believe in sheidim, seems to say (if I understand him correctly) that they are animals similar in form to sheidim. Thus, he writes on the pasuk that they are: כדמות שדים והם שעירים ברים.

A note of caution. Disbelief in sheidim may be hazardous to your health. Consider what happened to Ibn Ezra, according to the testimony of Rabbi Moshe Taku:

"Ibn Ezra wrote in his book," he says, "'Of a surety there are no demons in the world!' .Verily he erred in this matter, for they were ever at his side . . . and indeed they proved their existence to at him. I have heard from the people of Iglant [England?], where he died, that once when he was travelling through a forest he came upon a large band of black dogs who glared at him balefully; undoubtedly these were demons. When he had finally passed through their midst he fell seriously ill, and eventually he died of that illness."